The role of submarine A.E.2 on Anzac day by White, M. W. D.
The Royal Historical Society 
of Queensland 
JOURNAL 
Volume XIII, No. 4 November 1987 
The Role of Submarine A.E,2 
on Anzac Day 
M. W. D. White 
Presented at a meeting of the Society 
23rd April 1987 
After the loss of A.E.I near Rabaul on 14th September, 1914 it 
was decided that A.E.2 should return to England to serve the war 
effort in the northern hemisphere with the Royal Navy. 
On the 31st December, 1914, the second Australian Expeditionary 
Force of about 15,000 troops and 3,000 horses, embarked in twenty 
transports, sailed from King George's Sound. The only naval escort 
was A.E.2 in the tow of the Berrima. With much of the time under 
tow, and only two days rest in Colombo, plus the requirement to 
be continuously ready for action, the three officers and 29 crew found 
the passage back across the Indian Ocean even more uncomfortable 
than the one out. 
The convoy left Colombo on 18th January, 1915 after four days 
of rest there and arrived off Aden two days later and anchored off 
Suez on the 27th. The following day i\it A.E.2 preceded the troop-
ships through the Canal, being cheered and greeted by all the troops 
including the AustraHans from the First Expeditionary Force. Dur-
ing this passage the bridge had to be protected against occasional 
Turkish sniper fire, as the front li''e was within rifle shot of the 
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Canal. The Admiralty signal as to her employment directed her Com-
manding Officer, Commander H. H. G. D. Stoker R.N., not to 
Home Waters, as was expected, but to support the Dardanelles 
campaign. 
The submarine arrived on 5th February at Tenedos Island and 
joined the B Class boats already there. Being the only one of the 
latest E class, and being Australian, gave her a particular pride of 
place. The submarine depot ship was the Hindu Kush, formerly the 
merchant ship Hindustan.' The day after arrival, A.E.2 performed 
her first patrol in the mouth of the Dardanelles, and thereafter 
patrolled on alternate days, sharing the duties with the other sub-
marines.^ In the middle of February the arrival of further extensive 
naval forces in preparation for the naval attack on the forts 
necessitated the removal of the base from Tenedos back to Port 
Mudros, on Lemnos Island, a distance of some 40 miles. Thereafter, 
because of the increased distance, patrolling was for four days in 
the Straits, and four days rest back at Mudros. 
At the time that A.E.2 arrived the battle fleet was being reinforced. 
By 19th February, when firing commenced on the outer Turkish 
forts, there were 12 British and 4 French capital ships. 
On 15th March the Admiralty agreed to Admiral Garden's pro-
posal for a general fleet attack. Next morning the Admiral was placed 
on the sick list by his medical officer, and command of the fleet was 
passed to his second-in-command, Vice-Admiral J. M. de Robeck. 
The result of this offensive was a decisive loss to the allied fleet. 
Mines struck the British capital ships so that the Irresistible was sunk, 
the Ocean abandoned, and the Inflexible severely damaged. The 
French Bouvet was similarly struck with the loss of the ship and 600 
men. This reverse, brought about by mines, meant the end of the 
attempt at a purely naval penetration of the Dardanelles, and laid 
the ground for the military landings to follow.' 
The submarines were involved in patrolling near the surface units 
during the bombardments and could often see the results of hits by 
the guns. Having no guns themselves they had no immediate task 
to perform and Stoker addressed himself to the problem of a sub-
marine penetration of the Straits. It was a popular subject amongst 
all the submarine officers as they saw such a penetration possible 
only to submarines. Their submerged craft would be immune from 
gunfire but they were required to overcome, of course, the mines, 
patrol craft and quite difficult navigational hazards. These problems 
were described by Rear Admiral Sir \/illiam S. Jameson, as he later 
became, as follows: 
Even for surface ships the Narrows were a navigational hazard with 
sharp turns at Chanak and Nagara and strong 'sets' into the bays 
only 1,400 yards wide, the current flowed at no less than 4 knots. 
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Nowhere was it less than IVi knots and something like full speed 
would have to be used for about four miles — a heavy drain on 
the battery. Intelligence believed (accurately, as it proved) that there 
were five lines of mines between Sara Siglar Bay and Nagara, but 
in such constricted waters it would be impossible to run deep for 
long periods. Most of the passage would have to be made at 
periscope depth. All the waters through which he would have to 
pass were heavily patrolled by surface craft and the Turks had 
mounted guns along both shores, covering the Narrows and its 
approaches at point-blank range. The high speed necessary to make 
way against the current meant that the periscope would leave a 
considerable wake, and it was highly unlikely that a submarine 
would escape detection. Nor was this all. He would have to re-
main submerged until he had passed Gallipoli — a dive of about 
35 miles, against an average current of 1 Vi knots. A simple calcula-
tion made it evident that the capacity of even an E boat's battery 
was only just sufficient for the journey." 
Stoker had a particular reason to press his case to be given per-
mission to make the attempt. He was the most senior and experienced 
submarine commanding officer present, and had a proven crew. 
Apart from that he had the only E class, the only class with suffi-
cient battery capacity, and he knew that other E boats were likely 
to join the campaign soon and their commanding officers would be 
looking for the opportunity for themselves.' During a quiet patrol, 
therefore, he composed a letter to the Commander-in-Chief giving 
a clear plan for an attempt and set out the reasons why such an 
attempt could well be successful. Stoker considered that now was 
an opportune time as the minesweepers had cleared the mines for 
three to four miles inside the Straits, and this would put him in sight 
of Chanak on commencing the passage. But the letter was delayed 
as the A.E.2 ran aground that night on returning to Port Mudros 
on completion of the patrol (at 9:45 p.m. on 17th March). A light 
at the entrance to the harbour had been extinguished and Stoker was 
not told. Rescue operations were successful in refloating the sub-
marine but she had to steam to Malta for repairs to 13 hull plates.* 
Whilst the boat was at Malta the submarine depot ship Adamant 
arrived en route to the campaign, together with the submarines E.U 
(Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith), E.14 (Lieutenant-Commander 
Boyle), and E.15 (Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie). 
A.E.2 undocked on 16th April and left for Lemnos two days later 
after satisfactory trials, arriving there to berth alongside their new 
depot ship. Adamant, on 22nd April.' Hindu Kush was still parent 
ship to the five British B class and three French submarines operating 
from Mudros. The following day the crew oi A.E.2 were fallen in 
on the upper deck for public reading of a commendation by the 
Admiralty on A.E.2's work in steaming and escort of the Australian 
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Expeditionary Force. They were recommended to receive seven days 
leave at the first opportunity. But this was never to be as that day 
Stoker received his orders to sail and the submarine proceeded from 
the commendation to store ship for their first attempt on a penetra-
tion of the Dardanelles. They sailed that afternoon for Tenedos and 
obtained further stores from H.M.S. Swiftsure that evening.* 
During her docking in Malta ^.£".2 had been fitted with anti-net 
and anti-minefield attachments along the jumping wire which ran 
over the hydroplanes, the propeller guards and rudder; thanks to 
valuable information passed on from Nasmith of E. 11 resulting from 
the experience of their operations in the North Sea.' 
FIRST PENETRATION OF THE DARDANELLES 
Stoker had been keen to make the first attempt of the E boats 
but this was not to be. On 17th April the E.15 under command of 
Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie had made the attempt, been 
run aground by fierce currents, and stranded near Kephez light. The 
captain and six others were killed, and the remainder taken 
prisoner.'" For fear of loss of the submarine intact to the Turks the 
5.(5 attempted to torpedo the submarine and the destroyers Scorpion 
and Grampus attempted to shell, but all were beaten back by Turkish 
shellfire. The B.Il and another destroyer were equally unsuccessful. 
The job was finally completed in a daring night raid by two picket 
boats from Triumph and Majestic under the leadership of Lieuten-
ant Commander E. Robinson by the launch of a torpedo which 
struck home and rendered the submarine useless. 
Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie had a twm brother, 
Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Brodie, who was on the staff of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and who played an important role in these 
events. He had been aloft in a seaplane to bomb the enemy and spot 
for E.15 at first hght on the day of the loss. Although he could see 
the stranded submarine, and noticed that a shell had hit the conn-
ing tower, he did not learn until some time later of the death of his 
brother from that shell. He had also embarked in 5.(5 when she made 
her attempt to torpedo the stranded E.15 and thus thwart the Turks 
in their attempt to haul her off intact and make use of her. It was 
those same currents which stranded the B.6 on the shore only 100 
yards from E.15 on the night of the former's torpedoing attempt. 
The twins almost lost their lives in identical circumstances, but the 
B. 6 was able to get off and dive clear before being seen and shelled. 
It was this valuable information about currents gained in the B.6 
attempt which C. G. Brodie was able to pass on to the other sub-
marines when they were briefed for their attempts. And it was C. G. 
Brodie who insisted on reading aloud the signal of A.E.2's success 
to the tense war council, as will be related shortly. Brodie describes 
these stirring events in his book. Forlorn Hope.'' 
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On arrival at Tenedos on 23 April the Admiral signalled for the 
captain of A.E.2 to report to the flagship. The landing was set for 
the 25th and no effort for its success was to be spared. The Chief 
of Staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, as he then was, took Stoker to 
Admiral de Robeck who enquired as to how a submarine penetra-
tion of the Straits might be achieved. Stoker unfolded his plan. It 
was agreed to, and if he should succeed the other E boats were to 
follow.'^ 
Within two hours of the interview the submarine had stored and 
slipped from the Adamant and just after 2 p.m. lay off the Queen 
Elizabeth, while one of that ship's wireless officers checked the 
wireless equipment. She then proceeded to Tenedos, arriving at 
6:30 p.m. and performed a short trim dive and took on further stores 
from Swiftsure which had not been available from the submarine 
depot ship. It was early in the morning of 24th April 1915 when ^.£".2 
slipped and proceeded for the entrance of the Dardanelles. It was 
Stoker's plan to enter the Strait after the moon had set and to pro-
ceed solely on the surface for as far as he could penetrate undetected 
in order to conserve his battery power.'' 
The first attempt is well described in the diary later written by one 
of the crew, J. Wheat. 
A French submarine had been sunk in attempting the passage in 
January 1914"' and one of our submarines on April 17, 1915," 
so we were the third to make an attempt. We cast off from the 
Swiftsure at 1:30 a.m."* and proceeded to the entrance of the Dar-
danelles, it being our object to get as far as we could on the sur-
face without being seen by the searchlights and before daylight. 
On entering the Dardanelles, between Cape Helles and Coum Kale 
there was a small gasoline searchlight on our starboard hand." 
However we got by this without being noticed. We got about six 
miles inside the entrance. The searchlights on the forts of Chanak 
were very bright, but they seemed to be very careless as if not ex-
pecting to see anything. Owing to the searchlights we were forced 
to dive at 4:06 a.m. At this stage a very unlucky accident happen-
ed, our foremost hydroplane coupling broke. This was very serious 
as it meant we could not dive. Our only chance was to come to 
the surface and go back full speed on our engines as day was break-
ing and we were liable to be seen and fired on from the shore.'* 
And this they did, arriving back at Tenedos at 8:00 a.m. The blow 
to morale can be imagined. They had been active and busy all the 
previous day, up all night with the tremendous strain, expecting 
discovery and shelling at any second of the passage, and then the 
anxious race home before the encroaching dawn should reveal them. 
But they went about their work and the submarine anchored off 
Tenedos, the coupling was repaired by noon and they tested it with 
a dive. 
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THE SECOND PENETRATION 
Towards evening the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral de Robeck, 
again sent for Stoker and met him with tact and understanding. After 
a full account of the events, he was commended for having penetrated 
as far as he had; and given permission to try again that night. Stoker's 
orders were slightly altered by the Chief of Staff, Commodore Keyes, 
however, to take account of the fact that the Army landing was to 
be on the morrow. He was to attack and sink, if possible, any mine-
dropping ships found in the Narrows. This because the British capital 
ships would be operating in the Narrows firing in support of the land-
ing, and they would be vulnerable to damage from mines floated 
down in the current (as had previously happened to Irresistible, 
Ocean, Inflexible and Bouvet). In the words of Commodore Keyes, 
even if a complete penetration could not be achieved, the A.E.2 was 
to "generally run amok" off Chanak for the good reason that it 
was important to disrupt the Turkish naval forces as much as possible 
while the landings were taking place. 
J\\Q A.E.2 remained at anchor until early the next morning, when 
it weighed and set out on what was to prove the climax of its event-
ful career. Subsequent events are graphically described in the official 
report of her commanding officer, made in 1919, after his release 
from the Turkish prisoner-of-war camp." (The author's comments 
where they appear within the text of Stoker's report are contained 
in brackets.) 
Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, 1 lay at 
entrance to Dardanelles until the moon set, and about 2:30 a.m. 
on April 25 entered the straits at about 8 knots. Searchlights from 
White Cliffs, Kephez Point, and Chanak were sweeping the straits. 
Weather calm and clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows 
precluded all possibility of making the passage unseen, I decided 
to hold on the surface as far as possible. As I proceeded, the search-
lights of White Cliffs, sweeping the lower reaches of the strait, 
forced me to edge towards the northern shore." At about 4:30 a.m. 
being then not quite abreast of Swandere River, a gun opened fire 
at about 1 Vi miles range from the northern shore. (Otherwise 
known as Suan Dere. Presumably they were sighted by the lookouts 
of the battery of guns by the river.) 1 immediately dived, and at 
a depth of 70 to 80 feet proceeded through the minefield. During 
the ensuing half-hour or so the scraping of wires against the vessel's 
sides was almost continuous, and on two occasions something 
caught up forward became loose and scraped away aft. [Stoker's 
dilemma was that whilst deep he was relatively safe from mines, 
but ran the hazard of going aground. If he came to periscope depth 
for navigational safety he could easily strike a mine as they were 
set at shallow depth to explode on surface vessel hulls.] Having 
risen twice for observation in the minefield, which I considered 
necessary, as E.15 had run ashore in this vicinity, on rising the 
third time I found the vessel in a good position, rather over to the 
northern side of the straits, and approaching the Narrows, some 
two miles distant. The time was then about 6 a.m. 
Both E.15 and later B.6 had not gone below 40 feet when they 
experienced vicious tides and eddies which drove them both ashore 
at the same spot. But on getting off B.6 had found stable water at 
90 feet. As C. G. Brodie was in B.6 at the time he would certainly 
have communicated this important information to Stoker.^' There 
was also evidence that a strong counter current ran underneath the 
main outflow, and A.E.2 and subsequent boats were aided by it. 
Hence Stoker was surprised at his third periscope look to find himself 
so far advanced up the Straits as to be only 300 yards from the 
Narrows. 
In order to take stock of the situation 1 remained at 20 feet depth 
with periscope up. The sea being a flat calm, the periscope was 
immediately sighted, and a heavy fire was opened from forts on 
both sides of the Narrows; the accuracy of this made observation 
through the periscope difficult. (Reference to the Map shows that 
he would have been within range of four to five batteries at this 
point.) I observed a hulk anchored off Chanak on starboard side 
of Narrows, and several destroyers and some small craft moving 
in higher reaches. As the hulk rnight be dropping mines, 1 decided 
to attack it, and edged over to starboard for that purpose. A small 
cruiser, judged to be of Peyki Sevketk type, previously unseen, 
now emerged from behind the hulk. Believing this to be more likely 
to carry mines, I considered it would be better to attack it. At a 
range of three to four hundred yards I fired the bow torpedo, at 
the same moment ordering 70 feet in order to avoid a destroyer 
which was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vessel 
descended, the destroyer passed overhead close, and the torpedo 
was heard to hit. 
The Turkish account of the events of that morning differ in detail 
from that given by Stoker but it does confirm that the torpedo fired 
by ^.£".2 struck home and damaged the Turkish vessel Peyki Sevket 
causing the stranding of the vessel, although it was subsequently 
repaired and put back into service. Information supplied to the 
author of the Turkish account included as follows:— 
Peyki Sevket was ordered to search all the small ports and the Euro-
pean coast up to Haydarpasha. She was sailing in zig-zag fashion 
in order to find the submarine which could have been hidden in 
a small bay and busy with repairs when, near Bagados, all of a 
sudden the crew saw a torpedo coming towards them from the right 
hand side. They tried to turn to right quickly, but failed to escape 
from the torpedo. About 5 or 10 sailors were thrown overboard 
by the explosion. A life-boat was lowered and picked the sailors 
up. After the hit of the torpedo, the rudder-rod of the gunboat 
was bent and the wheel-gears and rudder were jammed in right 
hand turn position. 
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After this incident the Peyki Sevket sailed slowly towards the 
coast, listing to her left. Since there was no connection between 
the rudder and the engine room, she made a complete turn and 
was stranded on the coast. 
The ship was secured with anchors both from the rear and front 
near the coast. At the same time, the submarine fired another 
torpedo, but this did not hit the ship and passed underneath, strik-
ing the coast without exploding. As a result of the hit by the first 
torpedo a torpedo of Peyki Sevket gunboat was dislodged and hung 
on the left side of the boat. After several efforts the torpedo was 
released and it struck the coast and exploded. The crew then aban-
doned the gunboat. Later the ship was brought to the military dock 
in Istanbul and repaired in three months." 
The ramifications of A.E.2's appearance in the Turkish stronghold 
were many. One of them was in direct aid of the Anzacs, then fighting 
desperately to retain their hold after the initial landing. A Turkish 
battleship in the Narrows had been shelling across the peninsula onto 
the anchorage off the landing beaches and its fire had compelled 
the allied transports to move further offshore to a safer position, 
with consequent disruption to the Anzac landing support. It appears 
that this battleship caught sight of thQA.E.2's periscope just above 
Chanak and was forced to cease fire and run for her own safety, 
just when her fire was becoming most effective against the allied 
transports." The Turkish account on this point was to a like effect 
and it pointed out that whereas the Turkish bombarding vessels had 
previously moved when necessary the presence of A.E.2 necessitated 
their leaving the area entirely. 
Stoker's account continues: 
As the cruiser, dead ahead, might be expected to sink almost 
immediately, 1 altered course a point to starboard to avoid becom-
ing entangled with her. At the time I believed the vessel to be in 
the centre of the Straits. About four minutes later I altered back 
to the original course, and ordered 20 feet. As the vessel was ris-
ing, she hit bottom and slid up on the bank to a depth of 10 feet, 
at which depth a considerable portion of the conning tower was 
above water. Through the periscope I observed that the position 
was immediately under Fort Anatoli Medjidieh. 
Chatterton later wrote that the reason for this grounding was that 
A.E.2's gyroscopic compass had wandered and that a similar wander 
was the reason for the loss of E. 13 in September, 1915, on Saltholm, 
Denmark,^'' but whether this was so or the currents were perverse 
has never been established. The A.E.2 was in a similar exposed situa-
tion to the £.75 when she grounded, but a factor in favour of A.E.2 
was that the guns of Fort Anatoli Medjidieh could not depress suf-
ficiently to make a hit, and the guns of the other forts were at suffi-
cient range to make accurate shooting difficult. 
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As 1 looked, one of the guns fired, and the flash of the gun almost 
reached the top of the periscope, which I immediately lowered. 
For four minutes the sound of shell falling round the boat was 
continuous, and then, the efforts to refloat her proving successful, 
she slid down the bank to a depth of 70 feet, with head pointing 
down the straits. 
The main efforts to refloat would have been to alter the trim of 
the boat and go full astern on both screws. Of course. Stoker had 
to use full battery power to get them out of the critical position they 
were in; but at the same time he would have been only too aware 
that if the battery was used to such an extent that it became exhausted 
they would be deprived of all propulsion when dived. 
1 proceeded at 90 feet on port motor, with helm hard a-port to 
turn up straits, when two points (a point is 11 Vi degrees) off cor-
rect course, with head swinging rapidly, 1 went ahead on starboard 
motor. Vessel immediately struck bottom on Gallipoli shore, and 
slid up the bank to a depth of 8 feet. Through the periscope I judged 
the position to be immediately under Fort Derina Burnu, (probably 
the fort named Fort Diermon Burnu on the Map) and further 
observed two destroyers, a gunboat, and several small craft stan-
ding close off in straits firing heavily, and a cluster of small boats, 
which I judged to be picking up survivors of the cruiser. In this 
position we remained for five minutes. 
This second grounding was probably due to the effect of surface 
current which ran its swiftest about this spot — up to 5 kno t s , " and 
the swirls and eddies would have been quite unpredictable. It may 
also have been that they were unaware of any gyro failure and were 
still relying on it, or a combination of both. 
As vessel was lying with inclination down by bows, 1 went full speed 
ahead. Shortly afterwards she commenced to move down the bank, 
gave a slight bump, gathered way and then bumped heavily. She, 
however, continued to descend, and at 80 feet 1 dived off the bank. 
The last bump was calculated to have considerably injured the 
vessel, and probably impaired her fighting efficiency; but, as 1 con-
sidered my chief duty was to prove the passage through the straits 
to be possible, 1 decided to continue on my course. 
In connection with these groundings, 1 have to report that the 
behaviour of the crew was exemplary. In these two highly 
dangerous situations it was only their cool and intelligent perfor-
mance of their duties which enabled the vessel to be refloated. 
The admiration between Captain and crew was mutual. As to the 
incident lying under the guns of Fort Anatoli Medjidieh Mr Wheat 
recorded in his Diary:— 
During all this the Captain remained extremely cool, for all 
depended on him at this stage. It is due to his coolness that I am 
now writing this account. Nobody knows what a terrible strain it 
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is on the nerves to undergo anything like this, especially the Cap-
tain, as all depends on him." 
On rising to 20 feet shortly afterwards. Stoker observed the vessel 
to be in a good position approaching Nagara Point, with the 
destroyers, gunboats, and numerous other pursuing craft surround-
ing him on every side. At this, as on all other appearances of the 
periscope, the destroyers attempted to ram, and they dived to 70 feet. 
At this early stage of anti-submarine warfare there were no under-
water detecting devices such as sonar, and all surface craft could 
do was shoot, ram and drag wires and chains underwater in an 
attempt to do damage. It was only when the periscope was visible 
that they knew the exact position of the submarine. Considering the 
dangers of rising to take observations in the midst of so many pur-
suing craft, and the danger of grounding on Nagara Point when near 
the surface. Stoker decided to attempt to round the point without 
further observation, and proceeded to 90 feet for that purpose. Hav-
ing altered course by dead reckoning navigation, on rising to 20 feet 
some time later he found the vessel in good position in the centre 
of the Strait, heading for the Sea of Marmara with Nagara Point 
abaft the beam. He could see pursuing craft carrying out tactics 
astern of him below the point; but owing to the calm water the 
periscope was immediately sighted, fire re-opened and the chase 
resumed. He then dived to 90 feet and remained at that depth for 
half an hour. 
Stoker goes on in his report:— 
On rising to 20 feet to observe, 1 found the pursuing craft in close 
attendance on every side, and just ahead (one on either bow) two 
tugs with a wire stretching between them. 1 immediately dived to 
90 feet. Considering the situation, it seemed possible that our posi-
tion was marked through catching in a drift-net, or by some other 
means, and I decided to run in on the Asiatic shore and await 
developments, as battery power then remaining was not sufficient 
to get far out into Sea of Marmora, and thereby gain a fair chance 
of shaking pursuit. I therefore altered course 8 points to starboard, 
and ran aground about 8:30 a.m., lying at a depth of 80 feet. 
It being Sunday the Captain then held prayers with the crew, 
appointed a watchkeeper, and told the rest they were free to get some 
^^ ^^ P CRISIS MANOEUVRES 
Bottoming the submarine, as here, was a common tactic to con-
serve battery power as the submarine could not normally hover. To 
maintain depth it was required to be moving through the water and 
this required expenditure of battery power to drive the propellers. 
Hovering is possible for submarines, but it is a delicate manoeuvre, 
and contains the risk of coming to the surface unexpectedly; so this 
was no time for A.E.2 to try it. 
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At about 9 a.m. a vessel passed overhead, and something she was 
towing hit boat's side and jumped over. From this point on vessels 
continued to pass overhead at frequent intervals. As we were far 
out of the track of shipping passing up and down straits, 1 decided 
they must be searching for us, and about 11 a.m. considered it 
advisable to move to another place. The leaks occasioned by the 
last bump had caused a quantity of water to collect in motor bilges, 
etc., which water it was impossible to pump out, as oil mixed with 
it would immediately give away our exact position. The water was 
therefore carried forward, and emptied into beam-tube well etc. 
Consequently, on attempting to move off, 1 found trim had been 
lost, and all efforts to regain it without coming to the surface 
proved futile; so we remained in the same position throughout the 
day, while vessels continued to pass and repass overhead until 
7 p.m. 
As usual Stoker understated the position. When he attempted to 
move A.E.2 off the bank. Wheat states that they found the trim had 
been lost to such an extent that the submarine immediately sank so 
that the depth needle went hard over to the 100 foot mark, and the 
pressure was so great on it that the needle actually bent against the 
s t o p . " How close the submarine came to crushing is not known. 
Driving the submarine back on to the bank was all Stoker could do. 
.xff^f'W.^^y** 
The Peyki Sevket heavily damaged by the A.E. 2 on 25 April 1915. The original 
of this photograph is at Istanbul Naval Museum. 
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At 9:00 p.m., I rose to the surface, found no ships in sight, and 
commenced to charge batteries. No ships passed in the Straits dur-
ing the night. 
The submarine had been shut down for over 16 hours and the air 
had become bad. The crew were thus able to breathe fresh air as 
the diesels drew it into the boat and also by taking turns to go onto 
the conning tower. Wheat wrote that the air was so bad slightly for-
ward of the conning tower that a match would not burn for a frac-
tion of a second. The design of the submarine, then as now, pro-
vided that running the diesels performed a two-fold function; that 
of providing power to the submarine and batteries and also chang-
ing the air. 
Immediately he surfaced and the diesels started Stoker turned his 
attention to signalling his success back to the fleet. The wireless aerial 
flashed out its sparks in the damp of the night but the operator was 
unable to receive any answering call at this or any other time, despite 
extensive efforts and careful rechecking of the equipment. All they 
ould do was repeat the message time and again and hope that it was 
being received. It was received, and this gave rise to the second major 
ramification of A.E.2's feat so far as it directly affected the 
Australian landings on Gallipoli. (The first being the shifting of the 
Turkish battleship.) 
THE IMPACT OF THE MISSION 
The military landings at Gallipoli had, of course occurred mean-
while and about the time that A.E.2 rose to the surface north of 
Nagara Point, General Bridges and his staff were becoming more 
and more anxious about the Anzac position. Units were disorgan-
ized; the men were reported to be utterly worn out; and there were 
no available reserves to meet the heavy counter-attack expected in 
the morning. A conference was held ashore at 10:00 p.m. in a gully 
off Plugge Plateau between General Birdwood, Major-General 
Godley (commanding the New Zealand and Australia Division), 
Brigadier-General Walker (commanding the New Zealand brigade), 
and General Bridges and his staff." Upon being informed that the 
situation was perilous and that re-embarkation was strongly recom-
mended General Birdwood dictated the following message for 
despatch to the Commander-in-Chief: 
Both my divisional generals and brigadiers have represented to me 
that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralized by shrapnel 
fire to which they have been subjected all day after exhausting and 
gallant work in the morning. Numbers have dribbled back from 
firing lines and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even 
the New Zealand Brigade, which has only recently been engaged, 
lost heavily, and is to some extent demoralized. If troops are sub-
jected to shell fire again tomorrow morning there is likely to be 
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a fiasco, as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in 
the firing line. I know my representation is most serious, but if 
we are to re-embark it must be at once. 
The message was conveyed to Admiral Thursby, who repaired 
aboard the Queen Elizabeth as she arrived at the anchorage, together 
with Brigadier-Generals Carruthers and Cunliffe-Owen of the Corps 
Staff. Sir Ian Hamilton was roused at midnight by General 
Braithwaite, and in the Admiral's dining room (where Admiral 
Beatty was eventually to receive the surrender of the German fleet), 
there took place this important conference." 
While Sir Ian Hamilton was discussing the situation and taking 
up pen to write the reply. Lieutenant Commander C. G. Brodie came 
into the room with the signal heralding A.E.2's success. Ignoring 
furious signals from the Chief on Staff, Commodore Keyes, to retire, 
Brodie insisted on reading out the signal to the assembled officers.^" 
The effect of the news was enlivening and the psychological impact 
at that precise time in history was momentous." Further discussion 
ensued but now in a more optimistic tone and with the view of the 
staff officers fortified that there could be no question of re-embark-
ation. Commodore Keyes in his book. The Fight for Gallipoli (then 
Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes) wrote that the message "could 
not have been received at a more opportune moment". It is not 
known what Sir Ian Hamilton was about to write when Brodie read 
the signal but in the end he wrote the well known reply that kept 
the Anzacs there: 
Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig 
yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least two days 
to re-embark you, as Admiral Thursby will explain to you. Mean-
while the Australian submarine has got up through the Narrows 
and has torpedoed a gunboat at Chanak. Hunter-Weston, despite 
his heavy losses, will be advancing tomorrow which should divert 
pressure from you. Make an appeal to your men and Bodley's to 
take a supreme effort to hold their ground. P.S. You have got 
through the difficult business. Now you have only to dig, dig, dig, 
until you are safe." 
At the time, of course, the crew of the ^ . £ . 2 were not even aware 
that their wireless' message had got through. Years later Admiral 
Keyes, as he then was, told Stoker of the effect of his message." 
The third ramification of .4.£.2'5 success was the raising of morale 
of some of the Anzac troops. Most of those who came to know of 
the success of A.E.2 would have known the submarine from the con-
voy over to Suez; from the cheered passage through the Canal; and 
from operations out of Mudros. Soldiers clinging to the Gallipoli 
cliffs were informed by notices displaying the message: 
Australian sub A.E.2 just through the Dardanelles. Advance 
Australia." 
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Thus the effects of such a resounding success by the sailors in the 
A.E.2 could only have been beneficial to the morale of their em-
battled countrymen. 
As well as the effect of Stoker's signal on the conference concern-
ing the Anzac landing and on the Anzacs fighting on the peninsula 
there was an important effect created among the British and French 
submariners. One can imagine the elation felt by them on receipt 
of the news and the feeling that the loss of their comrades in £.75 
and Saphir had been vindicated. Within a few hours of the receipt 
of Stoker's signal Lieutenant Commander Boyle was signalled to 
report aboard the flagship. He was briefed by Commodore Keyes 
with more enthusiasm than precise instruction and at 3:00 a.m. on 
the 27th E.14 was under way in the Straits to repeat the feat now 
shown to be possible" and she was followed by others in due course. 
The situation into which the submarines led by A.E.2 thrust 
themselves had an important effect upon the Turkish communica-
tions supply and reinforcements to their troops opposing the Gallipoli 
landings. Turkey had a paucity of railway communications at the 
outbreak of war, and a shortage of locomotives and rolling stock. 
This meant that her main lines of communications from Constan-
tinople to Gallipoli and from the south of Marmora to Gallipoli were 
by sea. The only alternative was the link to the Gallipoli peninsula 
by rail to Uzun Keupri on the Adrianople line, and thence by road 
via Keshan and the isthmus of Bulair. The distance from Uzun Keupri 
to the Narrows by road was about 100 miles." 
With the appearance of A.E.2 the vital sea lane to the Gallipoli 
peninsula was threatened just at a critical time after the landings. 
As the Official History notes:— 
Her activity [A.E.2], and that of the E.ll who followed her on 
the 18th May, was of immense value to the Expeditionary Force, 
and towards the end of the month the Turkish sea-communications 
had been completely disrupted. After that day, thanks to the con-
tinued activity of the submarine service, no more reinforcements 
were sent from Constantinople by sea, and though the enemy con-
tinued to despatch food and stores in small vessels which hugged 
the coast and moved only at night, all Turkish writers agree that 
the maintenance of their army on the peninsula remained 
throughout the campaign an acutely anxious problem." 
But of course, the disruption by the submarines did not stop there. 
They carried the war right into the harbours, an example being 
Nasmith in E.I I sinking the Staml'd in Constantinople harbour 
itself, the first such feat for 500 years, and it threw the city into con-
fusion for some time. They also attacked the trains as they ran 
towards the peninsula as the line lay close to the coast for part of 
the distance. The First Lieutenant of E.ll even swam ashore with 
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explosives and damaged part of the line. Further, the submarines 
shelled the road where it lay close to the coast and by making pre-
arranged ranging shots they would wait until marching soldiers or 
other military targets had reached a certain part of the road and then 
surface and shell them to great effect. 
It may well be that if A.E.2 had not made the passage then 
probably E.ll, E.14 or one of the others would have done so. But 
the achievement of Stoker and the crew of A.E.2 was that they 
showed that the feat was possible. Before their success three sub-
marines had already fallen victim to the traps and hazards of the 
Narrows. By careful planning and outstanding courage and ship-
handling Stoker pioneered the route, so that before they set out 
Boyle, Nasmith etc. all had the comfort and encouragement of know-
ing that the feat was possible. 
The net effect of the submarine operations was devastating. Ex-
clusive of the damage done by E.20 and the French Turquoise the 
known Turkish losses to submarines in the campaign were:—" 
Battleships 1 
Destroyers 1 
Gunboats 5 
Transports 11 
Steamers 44 
Sailing vessels 148 
As one German writer put it, commenting on the work of the sub-
marines in the Marmora: 
The depredations of these unwelcome visitors became more and 
more alarming . . . Things came to such a pass that communica-
tion by water between Rodosto on the European and Panderma 
on the Asiatic side became impossible." 
The A.E.2 stayed operational in the Sea of Marmora for 5 days 
and made her presence felt in a most dramatic way, but space does 
not allow these details to be recounted here. She was holed by gun-
fire from a patrol boat on 30th April 1915 and sank in the Sea of 
Marmora. All of the crew were clear before she sank and were cap-
tured. Four died in the Prisoner-of-War camps and the rest were 
freed in 1919. 
Thus the role of the A.E.2 on Anzac Day was an important one. 
The feat of this band of brave and adventurous men on that day 
had a significant effect on the course of the Gallipoli campaign. For 
some reason this feat and its effects have not been given due recogni-
tion by historians, nor the popular press, T.V. or other media. 
Popular films concerning Anzac Day have not even made mention 
of the A.E.2. It is to be hoped that this deficiency will be overcome 
in future years. 
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1. Diary of A.E.2 by Able Seaman J. H. Wheat R.A.N. Unpublished, 
p. 7. Copy given to Author by the late Mr Wheat's family. Another 
copy held by National War Memorial, Canberra. 
2. H. H. G. D. Stoker, Straws in the Wind (Herhen Jenkins Ltd., 
London, 1925) p. 86 et seq. A breezy account written in 1923-1924 
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3. Interested readers are referred to the Official War Histories in par-
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4. Rear Admiral Sir William S. Jameson, K.B.E. C.B., Submarine 
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repair at Malta . . . see Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, The 
Fight for Gallipoli. 
6. Wheat, Ibid., p. 7. 
7. Wheat, Ibid. Also diary by Stoker Petty Officer H. A. Brown 
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is at Mitchell Library, Sydney (MSS) and another at National War 
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written document in the Mitchell Library and the typewritten docu-
ment in the War Memorial. 
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11. Seagee. (Nom de plume for Admiral Charles G. Brodie), Forlorn 
Hope (W. J. Boyce Ltd. 1956). 
12. Straws in the Wind, op. cit. p. 100. 
13. Op. cit., p. 102. 
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I5th January, I9I5, in an attempt to repeat the exploit of B.ll 
under Lieutenant Holbrook who torpedoed the Messudieh in 
December 1914 for which he was awarded the first naval V.C. of 
the War. There is a town in New South Wales named after him. 
15. Reference to E.15. 
16. For a brief narrative of earlier exploits of Allied Submarines in 
the Dardanelles see Brassy's Naval Annual I9I6, p. 39 et seq. 
17. Stoker records that there was one searchlight at White Cliffs, and 
another at Kephez Point (where E. 15 was lost); with the main ones 
at Chanak. 
18. Wheat, Ibid., p. 8. 
19. As reported in The Official History of Australia in the War of 
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1914-18, Vol. IX. The R.A.N., A. W. Jose, p. 240 et seq. 
20. A.E.2 was dived at 5:15 a.m. and so would not have heard the 
furious bombardment which marked the first phase of the landings. 
21. Dardanelles Patrol, Op. cit. Chapter 2. 
22. Details supplied by Turkish Government (through Australian 
Embassy in Turkey in response to author's request) in a letter from 
the Director of Foreign Military Attacks Department under cover 
of letter dated 26th November, 1974. 
23. History of the Great War. Military Operations. Gallipoli, Vol. I, 
Footnote I on p. 194. This is confirmed by information supplied 
to the author, through the good offices of Admiral Sir Alan 
McNicoll and the Australian Embassy in Turkey, from Turkish 
historical sources in answer to a request from the author. 
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37. Ibid., pp. 308-309. 
38. Ibid., p. 309. 
39. Two Low Ships, p. 172. Quoted in Dardanelles Dilemma. 
40. The First Lieutenant was Lieutenant G. A. G. Haggard R.N. who 
was awarded the D.S.C. and later settled in Australia. His sister 
married John Charles Wickham, the Brisbane family — see paper 
presented by Dr C. G. Drury Clarke, F.R. Hist S.Q. Journal Vol. 
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